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The Puzzle of Social Capital 
A Critical Review 
M.G. QUIBRIA 
This expository note provides a critical review of the burgeoning literature on 
social capital and highlights a number of conceptual and empirical issues. 
First, the concept of social capital remains largely elusive, with many different 
ideas attached to it. This elusiveness has serious ramifications for empirical 
and policy analysis. Second, while the concept of social capital is used to 
highlight the positive, productive aspects of sociability, it fails in important 
ways to qualify as a form of capital. Third, there are both theoretical and 
empirical presumptions that social capital can lead to undesirable 
socioeconomic outcomes. Finally, a large body of empirical work on social 
capital remains mired in measurement and estimation problems. 
 
Here I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him  
any real kindness; because I foresee, that he will return my service,  
in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain  
the same correspondence of good offices with me or others.  
And accordingly, after I have served him and he is in possession of the  
advantage arising from my action, he is induced to perform his part,  
as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal.  
 
David Hume 
Treatise of Human Nature (1740/1978, 521) 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Social interactions matter. They create social networks, foster trust and val-
ues, sustain norms and culture, and create community. These social entities—be it 
in the form of social network or community or norms and culture or trust and val-
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ueshave an important influence on economic as well as social outcomes. While 
this idea has antecedents in the writings of such diversity of earlier authors as Karl 
Marx, David Hume, Adam Smith, Antonio Genovesi, Emile Durkeim, and Thort-
sen Veblen, they have occupied pride of place in the recent literature on social 
capital. The concept of social capital has been applied to explain a wide variety of 
social and economic phenomena, ranging from the growth tragedy in Africa (East-
erly and Levine 1997) to the mortality crisis in Russia (Kennedy et al. 1998); from 
the successful group lending programs in Peru (Karlan 2003) to the flourishing 
township village enterprises in People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Weitzman and 
Xu 1994). This concept, which highlights the importance of nonmarket social in-
teractions in socioeconomic outcomes, seeks to fill a lacuna in the traditional 
neoclassical economic framework. It has been argued by sociologist Granovetter 
(1985) that the neoclassical framework posits an “undersocialized conception of 
man” that views man as atomized, anonymous, and bereft of any social influence 
through social relations. In other words, the neoclassical framework ignores the 
role of nonmarket social interactions in determining individual and collective be-
havior and shaping economic and social outcomes. In the real world, individual 
and collective behavior is continuously shaped by nonmarket social influences in 
the form of culture, norms, and social structure. An individual’s taste for books, 
restaurants, and movies is often largely determined by what is considered “hip.” 
Similarly, one’s educational aspirations, decision to smoke or take drugs, and bear 
children out of wedlock: all these decisions are significantly affected by the be-
havior of one’s peer groups, role models, and norms and values of the surrounding 
society.  
While there has been a proliferation of the literature on social capital in re-
cent years, it is fraught with serious conceptual and empirical measurement and 
estimation problems. This paper highlights some of these conceptual and empiri-
cal measurement and estimation problems that seem to have arrested the pace of 
progress of this literature. This paper divides these issues into four broad catego-
ries. First, the concept of social capital remains largely elusive. Different authors 
have attributed different meanings, leading to serious conceptual ambiguities. 
Second, in parallel with human and physical capital, this literature uses the meta-
phor of social capital to highlight the positive, productive aspects of sociability. 
However, in some important ways, social capital falls short of being a form of 
capital. Third, the existing literature emphasizes largely the positive conse-
quences, eschewing the bad ones. There are both theoretical and empirical 
presumptions that nonmarket social interactions can lead to undesirable social and 
economic outcomes. Fourth, a significant body of empirical works in this area re-
mains mired in serious measurement and estimation problems. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II deals with the defini-
tional aspects and the confusions surrounding them. Section III addresses the 
question: Is social capital really a form of capital? Section IV discusses the nega-
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tive aspects of social capital that have been largely ignored in the existing litera-
ture. Section V points to some measurement and estimation problems that tend to 
threaten advances in the literature. The final section offers some concluding re-
marks. 
 
                                                          
II.  DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: A CONFUSING MEDLEY 
 
Different writers have defined social capital in different ways. Sociologist 
Bourdieu, who has provided an early exposition of the concept, views social capi-
tal as “the aggregate of actual and potential resources which are linked to the 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance or recognition—or in other words, to membership in a 
group” (Bourdieu 1986, 248). This definition highlights the network1 aspect of so-
cial capital, i.e., the opportunities and advantages that accrue to individuals from 
group membership. Bourdieu’s concept of social capital is essentially individualis-
tic. In his writings, Bourdieu focuses on the instrumental value of social capital in 
deriving economic and social benefits from group membership and the impetus for 
individual investment in such membership. 
An early reference to the concept of social capital in the economics litera-
ture is to be found in the work of economist Glen Loury, who has provided an 
incisive criticism of the neoclassical theories of racial income disparity. Loury 
(1977, 176) argues:  
 
The merit notion that, in a free society, each individual will rise to 
the level justified by his or her competence conflicts with the obser-
vation that no one travels that road entirely alone. The social context 
within which individual maturation occurs strongly conditions what 
otherwise equally competent individuals can achieve. This implies 
that absolute equality of opportunity … is an ideal that cannot be 
achieved. 
 
Loury’s main contention is that the traditional view on intergenerational in-
come mobility is inadequate: it is based on a framework that is excessively 
 
1Network describes links among individuals in a group. A closed group with finite 
members is often known as club. The term network has been used to describe both the entire set 
of links among individuals in a group and the set of links around a specific individual.   Other 
related terms include “network closure “ and “networks with structural holes.” Network closure, 
which implies a dense network, means that everyone is connected with everyone in the group. 
Such a dense network is more effective in enforcing group cooperation (Coleman 1990). 
Structural hole refers to connectivity between networks. An individual who connects two 
otherwise disconnected networks spans a structural hole. Those who can play such a bridging 
role earn rents from such a position (Burt 1992).  
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individualistic and devoid of social dimensions. A full understanding of the issues 
of intergenerational income mobility among ethnic groups, Loury argues, needs to 
be based on a framework that incorporates such social dimensions as social net-
works that influence one’s access to opportunities. Individuals belong to different 
ethnic and social groups with different social networks, having different degrees 
of access to opportunities. This in turn can lead to persistent income disparities 
across ethnic groups. In other words, the orthodox economic theories that focus 
merely on creating a competitive market for individual human capital without con-
sideration of social networks would be inadequate to address the issues of 
persistent racial income disparities. In a recent paper, he further notes: 
 
Individuals are embedded in complex networks of affiliations: they 
are members of nuclear and extended families, they belong to reli-
gious and linguistic groupings, they have ethnic and racial identities 
and they are attached to particular localities. Each individual is so-
cially situated, and one’s location within the network of social 
affiliations substantially affects one’s access to various resources. 
Opportunity travels along these social networks (Loury 2000, 233). 
 
In short, Loury’s view of social capital parallels that of Bourdieu in its  
micro perspective: both emphasize the importance of social network as an indi-
vidual asset that affects one’s economic locus in society. 
A similar micro perspective is evident in the recent work of Glaeser, Laib-
son, and Sacerdote (2002, F439) who define social capital as: “a person’s social 
characteristics—including social skills, charisma and the size of the Rolodex—
which enables him to reap market and non-market returns from interactions with 
others.” They further add, “Individual social capital includes both intrinsic abili-
ties (e.g., being extroverted and charismatic) and the results of social capital 
investments (e.g., a large Rolodex).” This definition highlights a number of char-
acteristics of social capital: (i) it is an individual asset; (ii) some aspects of this 
asset are intrinsic to an individual and some can be augmented by individual ac-
tion; and (iii) it can be purposefully used to augment one’s market and nonmarket 
position.2 
The author who has done the most to popularize the concept, particularly in 
sociology, is Coleman. Coleman’s characterization of social capital is however as-
toundingly vague. While subscribing to an individual perspective that “social 
                                                           
 
2All social relationships are not instrumental and pursued to enhance one’s market and 
nonmarket positions.  Social relations can be noninstrumental and desired for their own intrinsic 
values. Social relations based on utilitarian calculations can be exceedingly undependable, as 
Aristotle has noted long ago in his Nichomachean Ethics that utilitarian friendship is a very 
unreliable type of friendship (van Stavern 2000). 
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capital constitutes a particular kind of resources available to an actor”, Coleman 
(1988) goes on to state: 
 
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a 
variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all 
consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain 
actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within the 
structure (Coleman 1988, S98).  
 
Coleman’s work has opened up the way for a whole plethora of new defini-
tions that often emphasize different and contradictory aspects of social capital. 
Indeed, Coleman himself has been a leading contributor to this potpourri of confu-
sion. While his examples of social interactions in maintaining trusting 
relationships—like those among the Jewish diamond merchants in New York 
(Coleman 1988)—are interesting, Coleman includes under the rubric of social 
capital many disparate ideas. As Portes (1998) has correctly noted, Coleman in-
cludes under social capital both the causes and consequences of social capital.  
That is, both the mechanism that generates social capital—such as the reciprocity 
of expectations and group enforcement of norms—and the benefits accruing from 
the possession of social capital—such as access to group resources. Coleman also 
included in his definition of social capital the “appropriable” social organizations,3 
which provide the context for sources and effects of social capital to materialize.  
The above individualistic perspective of social capital differs from the ag-
gregate/community perspective that seems to have emerged as the dominant 
paradigm in the literature, particularly in the hands of political scientist Putnam. 
Putnam, however, offers an even more expansive definition of social capital than 
Coleman. According to Putnam (1995, 67), “social capital refers to features of so-
cial organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” In his recent work, he provides 
further elaboration on the definition: 
 
Social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic vir-
tue.” The difference is that “social capital” calls attention to the fact 
that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a network of re-
ciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated 
individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital (Putnam 2000, 19). 
                                                           
3Appropriable social organizations, according to Coleman, refer to voluntary associations 
that are used for purposes other than their original intent. An example of an appropriable social 
organization is the residents’ association in an urban housing project that is initially formed for 
the purpose of pressurizing builders to fix such residential problems as leaks, crumbling 
sidewalks, etc. After the problems have been solved, the organization becomes available for 
appropriation by the residents to improve their quality of life.  
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According to this aggregate perspective, social capital—or it absence—is a 
property of a group or a community or even a nation as a whole, although there is 
less than unanimity among authors what this property is. Different authors have 
highlighted different aspects. 
Some recent notable contributors to this aggregative perspective include  
Inglehart, Fukuyama, Bowles, Gintis, and Hayami. Inglehart (1997, 188) equates 
social capital with “a culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive network of 
voluntary associations form.” And to him, culture is “a system of attitudes, values, 
and knowledge, that is widely shared within a society and is transmitted from gen-
eration to generation” (Ingelhart 1997, 15). His research interest is however to link 
this cultural dimension to economic and political outcomes at the country level—
in particular the level of democracy. 
Fukuyama (1995) equates social capital with “trusts”4 and highlights its role 
in reducing transactions costs and increasing economic efficiency.5 These transac-
tions costs are salient in day-to-day economic activities like finding the 
appropriate buyers and sellers, negotiating contracts, complying with government 
regulations, and enforcing contracts in the event of dispute or fraud. According to 
Fukuyama (1999, 16), social capital is:  
 
an instantiated set of informal values or norms shared among mem-
bers of a group that permit them to cooperate with one another. If 
members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably 
and honestly, then they will come to trust one another. Trust acts like 
a lubricant that makes any group or organization run more effec-
tively. 
 
                                                           
4The social capital literature often makes a distinction between personalized trust and 
generalized trust. The former, which exists between individuals of the same group, results from 
repeated interpersonal interactions. The latter, which exists between individuals of different 
social groups or kinship networks, results from the knowledge of the population characteristics, 
the underlying culture, and the incentives they face. While personalized trust takes time to 
develop, generalized trust is instantaneous.    
 
5Without using the term social capital, economists have long recognized the role of 
“trusts” in coping with market failures and establishing economic efficiency. A clear, explicit 
statement is to be found in Arrow (1971, 22) who notes: “In the absence of trust, opportunities 
for mutually beneficial cooperation would have to be foregone…. norms of social behavior, 
including ethical and moral codes … (are) reactions of society to compensate for market 
failures.” Indeed, even much before Arrow—and the advent of the first fundamental theorem of 
welfare economics—such 18th century philosopher-economists as David Hume, Adam Smith, 
and Antonio Genovesi wrote about the importance of trust in economic transactions (Bruni and 
Sugden 2000). Indeed they devoted a good deal of attention to such issues as: how trust can be 
rational, under what conditions such rational trust is possible, and the role of economic and 
social institutions to reproduce these conditions. 
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Echoing a similar theme, Bowles and Gintis (2002, F419) define social 
capital as: “trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live by the norms 
of one’s community and to punish those who do not.” This definition highlights 
the role of trusts and norms to bind the members of the group/community to coop-
erate. According to Bowles and Gintis, their definition follows a “social structural 
approach” that contrasts with the “individual-based approach” of Glaeser and  
others. 
Hayami (2001, 291) also emphasizes a social structural perspective: 
 
Relationships of mutual trust created through long-term and multiple 
transactions… would not only be effective in suppressing moral haz-
ards between the contracting parties but would also promote 
collaborative relationships within the wider community. …Thus, trust 
accumulated through personal interactions in the community in-
creases efficiency and reduces costs associated with the division of 
labor. In this regard, trust is a kind of “social capital” similar to social 
overhead capital such as roads and harbors. 
 
To Hayami, social capital is shorthand for “community” that generates a 
number of positive social externalities. The trust and social harmony that glues a 
community can help overcome the opportunism and moral hazard in interpersonal 
relationships. This in turn can help not only to reduce transaction costs in various 
types of market relationships but also overcome the free-rider problem in the pro-
vision of local public goods in a community. 
The above sampling of definitions suggests that social capital has been as-
sociated with many different notions.6 For some, social capital is an individual 
asset that comes from access to networks and social connections, whereas others 
view it as a shared asset that resides in a homogenous collective entity—such as a 
community with common interests and shared values. Some authors have focused 
on trusts and tolerance, while others have focused on the degree of civic and so-
cial engagements as the vehicle of such social capital. Still others have highlighted 
issues of culture and social norms. A strand of the literature applies the theory of 
repeated games7 to interpret norms of behavior, culture, and informal institutions: 
how they emerge and how they get sustained over time.8 
                                                           
6In the words of Dasgupta (2000, 325), “social capital (has been) a peg on which to hang 
all those “informal” engagements we like, care for and approve of.” In addition, the concept is 
being continuously stressed with reckless abandon. This has led Fischer (2001, 3) to comment 
that the concept is “expand(ing) in all directions like a swamp in a bad weather.” 
7Repeated-game models highlight how long-run self-interest can help overcome short-
term temptations of opportunism. A well-known result in game theory, known as the folk 
theorem, states that enlightened self-interest of sufficiently forward-looking players can ensure a 
full gamut of cooperative possibilities (Gibbons 1992). The basic intuition behind the theorem is 
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Given that the concept of social capital is a heterogeneous one, embodying 
a set of distinct but related notions, it throws up a serious measurement and aggre-
gation problem. This is most explicitly stated by Dasgupta (2000, 327): “It 
encourages us to amalgamate incommensurable objects, namely (in that order) be-
liefs, behavioral rules, and such forms of capital assets as interpersonal links, 
without offering a hint as to how they are to be amalgamated.” This led Dasgupta 
to suggest—quite sensibly—that these different notions of social capital need to 
be studied separately to understand how they are interrelated. 
 
III.   IS SOCIAL CAPITAL REALLY A FORM  
OF CAPITAL OR A BAD METAPHOR? 
 
Proponents of the concept of social capital have devoted considerable atten-
tion to explaining why it can indeed be considered as capital. Its current 
conceptualization draws on the early work of Pierre Bourdieu, which differentiates 
between different forms of capital that included economic capital, cultural capital, 
linguistic capital, scholastic capital, and social capital. Later on, in his work enti-
tled The Forms of Capital, Bourdieu (1986) narrows these different types of 
capital into three—economic, cultural,9 and social—and addresses the question of 
how these forms of capital interrelate and can be converted from one form to the 
other in order to maximize accumulation. From this perspective, he defines social 
capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition … which provides each of its members with 
the backing of collectively-owned capital” (Bourdieu 1986, 248). This view of so-
cial capital as resources—accumulated primarily as a set of obligations from 
others according to the norm of reciprocity—which agents can draw on to achieve 
 
that if an individual is to be punished in the future for noncooperative behavior today, this threat 
is sufficient to sustain cooperation over time. This result has been further generalized by 
Kandori (1992) who shows that when each member of the group punishes noncooperative 
behavior even when she is not directly affected, it leads not only to greater cooperation but also 
to the emergence of a set of strictures, something akin to a social norm. This paper also shows 
how the idea of social sanctions can be formalized. 
8The repeated-game approach suggests that one’s understanding of the other’s long-term 
self-interests may help one to “trust” the other and not succumb to certain short-term 
temptations. However, there is more to trust than rational calculation (Williamson 1993). To the 
extent that this calculative trust is important, the theory of repeated games can provide useful 
insights. 
 
9Cultural capital refers to one’s cultural features and social backgrounds (such as 
language, accent, manners, social conduct etc.) that influence one’s advance in life. Obviously, 
the concepts of social and cultural capital are closely interrelated. 
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their interests is however not new.10 A macro-aggregative perspective of social 
capital, as may be recalled, is to be found in the recent works of authors such as 
Putnam who view it as an attribute of social organization. Putnam (2000) also 
makes a further taxonomic distinction between two types of social capital—
bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital that connects people of similar 
backgrounds fosters denser social networks while bridging social capital that con-
nects people of dissimilar backgrounds creates larger networks. Notwithstanding 
this taxonomic refinement and the heuristic appeal for the idea of social capital as 
a form of capital, the argument is yet to win many converts in social sciences, par-
ticularly among economists. 
At first blush, social capital may seem like a natural complement to the con-
cepts of physical and human capital. However, analytically this extension is far 
from straightforward—and throws up serious conceptual incongruities. To Solow 
(2000, 6), “it is an attempt to gain conviction from a bad analogy.” And Arrow 
(2000) calls for an outright abandonment of the capital metaphor and the term so-
cial capital. To him, capital has three important characteristics: (i) capital has a 
time dimension; (ii) it requires deliberate sacrifice of the present for future benefit; 
and (iii) it is “alienable”—that is, its ownership can be transferred from one person 
to another. According to Arrow, social capital may have a time dimension similar 
to physical capital—for example, reputation or trust takes time to develop and 
hence it satisfies (i). However, social capital does not necessarily entail any mate-
rial sacrifice,11 and hence does not generally satisfy (ii). And finally, in most 
cases, it is difficult—as with human capital—to change the ownership of social 
capital,12 and hence does not satisfy (iii). All this would suggest that conceptually, 
social capital falls short of being a form of capital. 
And of course, this conceptual criticism applies as much to social capital in 
general as to Putnam’s taxonomic innovation regarding bridging and bonding  
social capital. In this connection, Fischer (2001, 3) rightly notes that Putnam’s use 
of such metaphors, as “bridging” and “binding” social capital is somewhat infe-
licitous as “both terms are more suited to a metaphor around ‘ties’ than around 
“capital.”  
                                                           
10As Portes (1998) notes, a similar perspective can be found in sociology in the classical 
analysis of social exchange by Simmel, which has resurfaced more recently in the works of 
authors of the rational action school such as Coleman and Schiff. 
11While some aspects of social capital are costly to acquire, others do not entail any 
material sacrifice. The latter category includes membership of religious and ethnic groups, the 
nobility one is born into, and individuals’ inherent social skills and charisma. 
12The problem of alienability in social capital has been expressed most starkly by Fischer 
(2001, 3) who observes: “It (social capital) is a metaphor that misleads: Where can I borrow 
some ‘social capital’? What is the going interest rate? Can I move some of my social capital off-
shore?” 
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Solow (2000) raises some measurement problems. While physical and hu-
man capital can be measured and their rate of returns calculated, such rigorous 
measurements are much more problematic in the case of social capital.13 Solow 
cites the example of the East Asian miracle economies and the total factor produc-
tivity estimates of Kim and Lau, and Collin and Bosworth, and notes that these 
estimates seem to suggest that either there is no special social capital story under-
lying the Asian success, just conventional production economics, or that social 
capital is precisely what accounts for the ability of these societies to accumulate 
capital and to mobilize skilled labor effectively. He concludes that “either way, 
there is something to look for that is at least capable of being found” (Solow 2000, 
9). In light of these conceptual and measurement problems, many economists are 
reluctant to label social capital as capital.14 
In other words, although there is a general consensus that social interactions 
have important influences on economic outcomes, there is not much of a consen-
sus whether these influences can be—or should be—meaningfully codified into 
such a metaphor as social capital. The situation has been nicely summarized by 
Bowles and Gintis (2002, F420):15 
 
Perhaps social capital, like Voltaire’s God, would have to have been 
invented if it did not exist. It may even be a good idea. A good term 
it is not. Capital refers to a thing that can be owned—even a social 
isolate like Robinson Crusoe had an axe and fishing net. By contrast, 
the attributes said to make up social capital describe relationships 
among people. As with other trendy expressions, “social capital” has 
                                                           
13As Dasgupta (2000) has noted, there is a serious measurement problem with social 
capital, even if it is assumed that it is a type of capital. To aggregate the different components of 
social capital as networks and norms into a stock of capital, one would require a set of market 
prices associated with different types of social capital. However, these are the commodities 
where market failures are most conspicuous. 
14Even many ardent advocates of the concept of social capital concede that social capital 
is not really a form of capital in the strict sense of the term. For example, Ostrom (2000), who 
argues that social capital is a fundamental concept and an essential complement to natural, 
physical, and human capital, notes that social capital is different from other forms of capital in 
some important ways. She identifies four key differences: First, social capital does not wear out 
with use—on the contrary, it erodes from a lack of use. Second, it is not easy to see or measure. 
Third, it is hard to construct through external (for example donor) intervention. Finally, national 
and regional government institutions strongly affect the level and type of social capital available 
to individuals to pursue long-term development efforts. Indeed, these key differences constitute 
the very basis for the Arrow-Solow critique. 
 
15Bowles and Gintis advocate abandoning the term social capital in favor of community 
that “better captures the aspects of good governance that explain social capital’s popularity, as it 
focuses attention on what groups do rather than what people own” (Bowles and Gintis 2002, 
F420). It is noteworthy that a recent volume by Aoki and Hayami (2001) on the subject was 
named, Communities and Markets in Economic Development. 
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attracted so many disparate uses that we think it better to drop the 
term in favor of something more precise. 
 
IV.   TAUTOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS  
AND EXAGGERATION OF BENEFITS 
 
Much of the existing literature defines social capital in a way that tends to 
exaggerate its beneficial aspects. As Portes (1998) and Durlauf (1999) have noted, 
these definitions confuse its sources with consequences and its existence with 
functions. In other words, the evidence of the existence of social capital is often 
inferred from its positive outcomes. For example, as noted earlier, Coleman 
(1988) defined social capital “by its functions” and Putnam (1995) viewed it in 
terms of “features of social life … that facilitate cooperation and coordination for 
mutual benefit.” This line of argumentation leads to circuitous reasoning—and ex-
aggeration of the benefits of social capital. Indeed, social capital has its benefits 
and costs: it is not an unmixed blessing. It can lead to such adverse effects as ex-
clusions and market distortions, moral hazards, restrictions of individual freedoms, 
and perpetuation of backward norms. The following further elaborates these 
points.  
First, social capital can open up economic opportunities for the members of 
the network. However, these networks can at the same time act as a restrictive de-
vice and limit entries for those outside the network. Race, ethnicity, religion, 
language or the simple confluence of economic interests is often the basis of many 
such real world market and nonmarket exclusions. As cited by Portes (1998), 
Waldinger (1996) in his study of immigrant labor in New York city notes that en-
try into jobs in construction and service industries is highly restricted and poor 
blacks cannot secure such jobs for lack of access to the ethnic networks that con-
trol the recruitment process. Similarly, Bardhan (2002) has noted that in 
developing countries the rural poor are often excluded from publicly provided ser-
vices because of the capture of the local government. This capture by the local 
elite is facilitated by their social capital that works through “the multiplex inter-
locking social and economic relationships (that exist) among local influential 
people” (Bardhan 2002, 194).  Finally, Smith (1776/1976) was the first to note the 
harmful influence of social networks of merchants in creating market distortions. 
On this, Smith famously stated, 
 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment 
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed 
to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, 
or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law 
cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling 
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together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much 
less to render them necessary (Smith 1776/1976, 232). 
 
While these “conspiracies” of traders can help the group members to safe-
guard their economic interests or perpetuate monopoly privileges, they certainly 
do not help the society at large.16 In a similar vein, Olson (1982) also argues that 
the collusion of interest groups leads to unproductive rent-seeking activities and is 
harmful to economic development 
Second, while social capital can provide the much-needed wherewithal for 
innovation and entrepreneurship, it can at the same time lead to individual leth-
argy and slothfulness. On one hand, social capital can help an entrepreneur in his 
effort to mobilize the much needed capital and information, it can on the other 
hand dilute one’s personal incentive to work hard. Social capital can lead to free 
riding, moral hazard, and the creation of welfare haven. The resources and hard 
work of those who succeed often need to underwrite the indolence and economic 
insolvency of those who fail. Social capital can thus be a safety net that penalizes 
successes and rewards failures. Geertz (1963) offers a concrete illustration from 
Bali where unsuccessful job-hunting and money-seeking kinsmen were found to 
be constantly draining and taxing successful entrepreneurs. Social capital, in con-
junction with the redistributive social norm of many traditional societies, may 
represent a serious obstacle to accumulation and successful entrepreneurship.17 
Third, while membership of a community has its advantages, it often en-
forces strict conformity, infringes on individual freedoms, and creates pressures 
for submission to mediocrity. Many independent-minded individuals consider 
these aspects of a community life suffocating—and have attempted to escape them 
for the freedom of a more impersonal urban life. As Hayami (1998) has noted, 
enlightenment philosophers such as Montesqieu considered traditional customs 
and norms as oppressing human minds. These traditional customs and norms, 
needless to emphasize, can have a similar dampening effect on the dynamics of 
                                                           
16Sobel (2002) provides another interesting illustration by using the metaphors of the 
prisoner’s dilemma. When the prisoners cooperate with each other and do not confess they 
receive a brief sentence. This conspiracy of the culprits certainly makes the prisoners better off 
(relative to the equilibrium outcome), but not the rest of the society who would presumably 
want to see the criminals put behind bars. 
 
17In developed countries, social networks can perpetuate a culture of poverty when the 
disadvantaged interact only amongst themselves. Such social networks among the poor are 
usually more efficient at supplying information on welfare eligibility than job availability. They 
also tend to create negative peer pressures—rather than positive role models—to nourish a 
culture of welfare dependency. A recent paper by Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) 
provides strong empirical support from the United States (US) in favor of this hypothesis. Their 
careful empirical work confirms the existence of a high degree of correlation between language-
based social networks in a neighborhood and the extent of welfare dependency among groups 
(which are reliant on welfare). 
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economic development. In his theory of entrepreneurship, Schumpeter (1934 and 
1950) discussed the concept of “industrial mutation”: how entrepreneurship helps 
propel the process of economic development in an evolving market economy. Ac-
cording to this concept, industrial mutation essentially entails a transition from 
personal capitalism, ensnared by traditional behavior, to rational capitalism, which 
“breaks the crust of convention” and thrives on the impersonal forces of the mar-
ket. 
Finally, social capital in the form of group membership can be as much a 
cause as a cure for poverty. Certain social and ethnic groups often find themselves 
trapped in a bad equilibrium of norms and values that are inimical to individual 
and collective development. A bad equilibrium, once established, is sustained by 
role model and peer group influences. Adhering to such a bad equilibrium is indi-
vidually rational: it is optimal for individuals to subscribe to such group norms 
because any deviation results in social opprobrium and group retribution and 
hence lower individual welfare. However, the group—as well as the society as a 
wholeis worse off because it produces socially suboptimal behavior (behavior 
that is either destructive or risky). Teenage pregnancy, group crime and drug ad-
diction are examples of such behavior, which is often sustained through group 
conformity.18 When a network or group leads to such a bad equilibrium that sus-
tains socially harmful norms and values, the members of the network or group and 
the society as a whole would then be better off if such a network or group did not 
exist. 
 
V.  THE PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPIRICS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
A sizeable empirical literature on social capital has emerged in recent years. 
A high-profile work that has brought social capital to the doorstep of the wider 
policy community, particularly in developed countries, is Putnam’s (2000) much-
celebrated book, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Commu-
nity.19 In this book, Putnam attributes a whole variety of social ills in the US 
today—from declining voting participation to increasing crime rates to shrinking 
philanthropy—to lack of social capital. While the book puts forward an interesting 
                                                           
18A recent article in the The New Your Times (Songtag 2003) provides a poignant account 
of the failures of the Cambodian-American immigrants as an ethnic group who seem to be 
caught in a vicious circle of suboptimal outcomes. In particular, the story of Many Chout Uch, a 
gang member who faces deportation for crime, offers perceptive insights into the features of the 
communityits existing structure and group dynamic—that contains in itself the logic of such 
dire social failures.   
19This book is a grandiose elaboration of his thesis contained in the earlier shorter article, 
Putnam (1995). 
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hypothesis20 and culls together an impressive body of evidence, its empirical 
analysis remains rudimentary21 and its discussion of policy somewhat cavalier. 
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the important contribution of this work has 
been to stimulate research on social capital and its role in redressing social and 
economic problems. 
Social capital has also been gaining popularity as a concept for analyzing 
the socioeconomic problems of developing countries. The emerging literature fol-
lows three major strands. The first strand deals with the link between economic 
growth and social capital. Some of the notable studies in this regard include 
Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001), Collier and Gunning (1999), 
Easterly and Levin (1997), and Rodrik (1998). The first two papers confirm, in the 
context of cross-country growth regressions, the relationship between economic 
performances and trust in people. The last three studies argue that ethnically het-
erogeneous societies (implying lower level of social capital) are slow to growth or 
to adjust to external shocks.22 
The second strand deals with the issue how social capital can substitute for 
missing capital and insurance markets. The contributions in this area include van 
Bastelaer (2000); Goldstein, DeJanvry, and Sadoulet (2001); Fafchamps and Lund 
(2003); and Morduch and Sicular (2001). The first study highlights the role of ex-
isting social capital ties in improving the poor’s access to social capital. In group 
lending schemes, social ties among borrowers can help reduce transaction costs of 
screening, monitoring, and enforcement. The study by Goldstein, DeJanvry, and 
Sadoulet highlights the role of social capital as a social safety net mechanism in 
Ghana and identifies the factors that help shape the social connection that under-
                                                           
20A number of authors—for example, Paxton (1999) and Ladd (1996)—have contested 
the claim that there has been a decline in social capital in the United States. 
21Much of the analysis is conducted in terms of bivariate graphical representation, which, 
as is well known, cannot distinguish between correlation and causality. The study also reports 
some multivariate regression results that seem to be marred by problems of omitted variables 
and unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
22An interesting qualitative study that explores the relationship between trust and 
macroeconomic performance is Fukayama (1995). In this study, Fukayama classifies countries 
into low trust and high trust countries. According to his assessment, Germany, Japan, and US 
are high trust countries whereas PRC; France; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Republic of Korea; and 
Taipei,China are low trust countries. He argues that high trust countries have greater economic 
success as they can implement more efficient organizational innovations. When trust is limited 
to families, the supply of capital and qualified managers remains constrained, and this in turn 
restricts the scale of private family firms. While the basic hypothesis of Fukayama seems 
plausible, his classification of countries based on trust is highly impressionistic as is his much-
vaunted empirical relationship between trusts and economic performance. As the recent record 
of economic performance of nations indicates, some of his low trust countries have made 
remarkable organizational innovations and registered stellar economic performance (for 
example, the PRC) whereas some of his high trust countries seem to be mired in near perpetual 
economic stagnation (for example, Japan). 
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pins the insurance mechanism. The Fafchamps-Lund study analyzes the role of 
networks of friends and relatives in providing mutual insurance in the Philippines. 
The final study by Morduch and Sincular (2001) analyzes the effectiveness of so-
cial capital as a risk-sharing mechanism in rural People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in the postreform period.  
The third strand deals with the issue how social capital can help circumvent 
the collective action problem in the provision of local public goods. These studies 
include Ostrom (2000); Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994); Bardhan (2001); 
Kikuchi, Fujita, and Hayami (2001); and Otsuka and Tachibana (2001). In their 
study of the irrigations system in developing countries, Ostrom and her collabora-
tors analyze how social capital has been helpful in eliciting cooperation among 
farmers, evolving a common norm of behavior, and circumventing collective ac-
tions problems. The studies by Bardhan (2001) on the irrigation communities in 
South India; by Kikuchi, Fujita, and Hayami on the irrigation system in the Phil-
ippines; and by Otsuka and Tachibana (2001) on the community forestry in Nepal 
all offer interesting illustrations of the importance of social capital in the manage-
ment of community resources. 
As a cursory review of the empirical literature on social capital would sug-
gest, the literature is diverse in terms of methodology and the degree of analytical 
sophistication. Some of it is descriptive—and does little beyond suggesting the 
importance of social capital (in whatever sense the term is defined in the particular 
context). Some of it is more quantitative, often involving regression-type analysis. 
However, a large segment of this quantitative literature suffers from various tech-
nical, econometric problems. 
In a recent paper, Durlauf (2002) examines the estimation problems that are 
common to the social capital literature. While many of these problems are, at some 
level, endemic to a wide body of the empirical studies, they seem to be particu-
larly serious for the social capital literature. In the words of Durlauf (2002, F474):  
 
The empirical social capital literature seems to be particularly 
plagued by vague definition of concepts, poorly measured data, ab-
sence of appropriate exchangeability conditions, and lack of 
information necessary to make identification claims plausible. These 
problems are particularly important for social capital contexts as so-
cial capital arguments depend on underlying psychological and 
sociological relations that are difficult to quantify, let alone measure. 
 
Further discussing these problems, Durlauf notes in the context of three 
benchmark empirical studies23 three sets of estimation issues. First, social capital 
                                                           
23The putative rationale for choosing these three studies has been that they are well 
regarded in the social science literature and analyze the social capital issues in different 
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studies often fail to distinguish between social and nonsocial-capital effects that 
arise from group membership. However, this problem of identification is not re-
solved by incorporating a full range of alternative group influences; it requires a 
clear definition of social capital and conceptualization of the underlying causal 
process. Second, social capital proxies are often endogenous and this requires the 
use of instrumental variables based on ad hoc exogeneity assumption. However, 
constructing credible instrumental variables in this type of regression requires a 
theory of the determinants of social capital. Third, social capital regression exer-
cises rely on untenable comparability assumptions.24 That is, the analysis assumes 
that the regression uses comparable objects as observations. This problem is par-
ticularly serious in aggregative growth regression studies.25 In light of these 
problems, Durlauf suggests that empirical analyses on social capital need to step 
back from “grandiose approaches” and limit themselves to more specific socio-
logical dimensions of individual behavior and rely on the use of more 
experimental data. 
 
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, social capital has come to signify dif-
ferent things to different authors. Given the wide diversity of notions associated 
with the term social capital, the concept has remained largely amorphous and 
lacks the clarity and precision required of a concept to be used for rigorous em-
pirical work. 
 
contexts: one at the individual level in the US, another at the individual level in a developing 
country, and still another at the national level, involving cross-country regression analysis. 
Furstenberg and Hughes (1995) explore, with data from Baltimore (US), how the probability of 
an individual dropping out of school is related to social capital factors such as the presence of a 
father in the household and the educational aspirations of the person’s friends. Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999) examine the role of social capital in the form of membership of groups in 
influencing household outcomes in rural Tanzania. Finally, Knack and Keefer (1997) examine 
in the context of a cross-country regression framework the impact of social capital—such as 
civic cooperation and trust—on economic growth. 
24As quoted by Durlauf (2002), Draper et al. (1993, 1) describes the importance of 
exchangeability in empirical exercises in the following manner: “Statistical methods are 
concerned with combining information from different observational units and with making 
inferences from the resulting summaries to perspective measurements on the same or other 
units. These operations will be useful only when the units to be combined are judged to be 
similar (comparable or homogenous).” 
 
25As is now widely known, results of cross-country growth regressions are often 
extremely fragile. These types of exercises have been subject to considerable criticism by both 
economic theorists and econometricians. Growth theorists find the empirical equations ad hoc 
without any sound analytical basis, while econometricians complain about the various technical 
econometric problems—such as unobserved fixed effects, measurement errors, endogeneity, 
parameter heterogeneity etc.—that sully the effort. See Quibria (2002) for further details on this. 
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Notwithstanding this limitation, recent years have seen a mushrooming of a 
literature that applies many different notions of social capital to analyze many di-
verse economic and social issues. Despite its exaggerated claims, as Portes and 
Landolt (1996) rightly note, much of this literature does not go beyond calling at-
tention to “the possible individual and family benefits of sociability” or “a 
nuanced understanding of the pros and cons of groups and communities.” The pol-
icy conclusions are often very banal.26 Durlauf (2002, F459) is even more stark in 
his criticism of the empirics of social capital when he asserts that “whether these 
(social capital) studies establish the empirical importance of social capital in un-
derstanding the various socio-economic outcomes, my conclusion is no.” These 
assessments are obviously neither very salutary nor do they provide a clean bill of 
health regarding the state of quantitative empirical research in this area. 
To move the literature forward, it would be useful first to get the concept 
right. It should begin with the acknowledgement that there is no single entity 
called social capital, but many distinct notions—such as trusts, norms, culture, 
community, and networks—highlighting different aspects of nonmarket social in-
teractions. It is heartening to note that recent works in this area, particularly in 
economics, seem to reflect this heterogeneity of perspectives, focusing on differ-
ent aspects of social interactions and drawing distinctly different analytical and 
policy implications. However, to avoid confusion and to achieve greater analytical 
traction and empirical understanding, social capital studies need to proceed with a 
clear definition of the specific notion of social capital being applied.27 
As noted earlier, despite the recent proliferation of studies in social capital, 
this has not been accompanied by a commensurate increase in analytical rigor. 
Analytical rigor does not necessarily mean heavy reliance on quantitative meth-
ods. Historical and qualitative studies can be as much rigorous and informative 
about the underlying social capital mechanisms as the regression studies that are 
the bread and butter of economists. Indeed, there are certain questions that are bet-
                                                           
26In a recent paper, Costa and Kahn (2003) surveys the proliferating economic literature 
on the determinants of civic engagement in a community. This survey covers about 15 studies 
encompassing different nations, different social capital measures, and different time periods. 
The central policy message that emerges from this survey, as the authors report, is 
“heterogeneity reduces civic engagement.” This message, which should surprise nobody, 
provides precious little guidance for policies. As much of the heterogeneity takes the form of 
ethnic and racial diversity, it is not amenable to policy manipulation—except by odious political 
means!  Hence, this type of message is cold comfort to real world policymakers!  
27This definition is important to guide empirical analysis—in particular, its choice of the 
social-capital indicator. Different social-capital indicators—even if we assume they are 
interconnected and reflect the different attributes of the underlying social-capital process—do 
not move in sympathy. Fischer (2001) examines seven indicators of social capitaltrusting 
most people, church attendance, belonging to organizations, socializing with neighbors, 
socializing with friends outside the neighborhood, and giving money to charity—from the 
General Social Surveys (1972-1999) and finds little coherence among them. The different 
indicators often display little correlation, and they even sometimes exhibit opposite trends. 
36   ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 
ter addressed in broad qualitative terms than others, which may require greater re-
liance on the quantitative approach. However, the success of the quantitative 
studies depends on the availability of the relevant and reliable data. 
Measuring social capital, which is often vested in such entities as trust, 
community, peer pressure, role models, and networks, is difficult. The task be-
comes doubly difficult if this measurement needs to incorporate both quality and 
quantity. However, further progress with the empirical analysis of social capital is 
inextricably connected with the availability of better quality data. However, this is 
not easily obtained. Data on social capital have been sourced in a number of dif-
ferent ways. First, surveys of perceptions can be a major source. However, they 
are often an imperfect source, as the respondents to surveys have no incentive to 
answer honestly or carefully.28 Second, the standard practice in empirical social 
sciences including economics is to infer the nature of economic and social interac-
tions from observations of outcome data. However, such outcome data have 
limited ability to discriminate among alternative hypotheses regarding the under-
lying processes.29 Finally, economic experiments can be an important source of 
data on social capital. As social capital concepts relate to social interactions in-
volving subjective processes, it is therefore only natural that social capital studies 
rely considerably on experimental and subjective data. However, this is something 
that until recently, with perhaps the exception of social psychologists,30 aroused 
very little enthusiasm among economists and other social scientists. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aoki, M., and Y. Hayami, eds., 2001. Communities and Markets in Economic Development. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Arrow, K. J., 1971. “Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects of Externalities.” In 
Intriligator, ed., Frontiers of Quantitative Economics. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
                                                           
28The emerging experimental literature confirms this divergence. In a recent paper, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) provide a more in-depth discussion with illustrative examples 
why such subjective survey data can be misleading. 
29An exception to this includes the social capital data collected by the World Bank under 
the rubric of Social Capital Assessment Tool, which specifies in sufficient detail the level of 
individual interactions at the household, community, and organization levels. I am indebted to a 
referee for bringing this to my attention.  
 
30An interesting recent study that relies on such experimental data is Glaeser et al. (2000). 
The study uses a sample of Harvard undergraduates to carry out two experimental trust games 
and generate data on trust. They also make a survey about trustworthiness. The survey and the 
experiments together provide a number of empirical results regarding trust and trustworthiness. 
These results include: trusting behavior and trustworthiness rise with social connections and 
decrease with differences in race and nationalities; while certain individuals appear to be 
persistently more trusting, they do not reveal that they are more trusting in their surveys: and 
people behave in a more trustworthy manner toward individuals of higher social status. What is 
to be noted is the difference between the survey and the experimental results. 
THE PUZZLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
A CRITICAL REVIEW  37 
———, 2000. “Observations on Social Capital.” In P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin, eds., Social 
Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. World Bank, Washington, D. C. 
Bardhan, P., 2001. “Water Community: An Empirical Analysis of Cooperation on Irrigation in 
South India.” In M. Aoki and Y. Hayami, eds., Communities and Markets in Economic 
Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
, 2002. “ Decentralization of Governance and Development.” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 16(1): 185-205 
Bertrand, M., E. F. P. Luttmer, and S. Mullainathan, 2000. “Network Effects and Welfare Cul-
ture.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(August):1019-55. 
Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan, 2001. “Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for 
Subjective Survey Data.“ American Economic Review May:67-72. 
Bruni, L., and R. Sugden, 2000. “Moral Canals: Trust and Social Capital in the Work of Hume, 
Smith and Genovesi.” Economics and Philosophy 16(Spring):21-45. 
Burt, R. S., 1992.   Structural Holes:  The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.  
Bourdieu, P., 1986. “Forms of Capital.” In J. Richardson, ed., Handbook of Theory and Re-
search for the Sociology of Education. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Bowles, S., and H. Gintis, 2002. “‘Social Capital’ and Community Governance.” Economic 
Journal 112(487):F419-36. 
Coleman, J. S., 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of 
Sociology 94:S95–S120. Reprinted in P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin, eds., Social Capital: 
A Multifaceted Perspective. World Bank, Washington, D. C. 
, 1990. Foundations of Social Theory.  Cambridge:  Harvard University Press.  
Collier, P., and J. W. Gunning, 1999. “Explaining African Economic Performance.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 37(November):64-111. 
Costa, D., and M. E. Kahn, 2003. “Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An 
Economist’s Perspective.” Perspectives and Politics 1(1, March). Forthcoming. 
Dasgupta, P., 2000. “Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital.” In P. Dasgupta and 
I. Serageldin, eds., Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. World Bank, Washington, 
D. C. 
Draper, D., J. Hodges, C. Mallows, and D. Pregibon, 1993. “Exchangeability and Data Analy-
sis.” Journal of Royal Statistical Society Series A(156):9-28. 
Durlauf, S., 1999. “The Case ‘Against’ Social Capital.” Focus 20:1–5. 
———, 2002. “On the Empirics of Social Capital.” Economic Journal 112(November):F459-
79. 
Easterly, W., and R. Levine, 1997. “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4):523-44. 
Fafchamps, M., and S. Lund, 2003. “Risk-sharing Networks in Rural Philippines.” Journal of 
Development Economics. Forthcoming. 
Fischer, C. S., 2001. “Bowling Alone: What’s the Score?” Paper presented at the meetings of the 
American Sociological Association, Anaheim, California, August 2001. 
Fukuyama, F., 1995. Trust. New York: Free Press. 
———, 1999. The Great Disruption. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Furstenberg, F., and M. Hughes, 1995. “Social Capital and Successful Development Among At-
Risk Youth.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 57:580-92. 
Geertz, C., 1963. Peddlers and Princes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gibbons, R., 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
38   ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 
Glaeser, E., D. Laibson, and B. Sacerdote, 2002. “The Economic Approach to Social Capital.” 
Economic Journal 112(483):F437-58. 
Glaeser, E., D. Laibson, J. Scheinkman, and C. Soutter, 2000. “Measuring Trust.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 115:811-41. 
Goldstein, M., A. DeJanvry, and E. Sadoulet, 2001. “Is a Friend in Need a Friend Indeed? Inclu-
sion and Exclusion in Mutual Insurance Networks in Southern Ghana.” Department of 
Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Mimeo. 
Granovetter, M., 1985. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embedded-
ness.” American Journal of Sociology 91:481-510. 
Hayami, Y., 1998. "Community, Market and State.” In A. Maunder and A. Valdes, eds. Agricul-
ture and Government in an Interdependent World. Aldershot: Gower. 
———, 2001. Development Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hume, D., 1740, 1978. A Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Inglehart, R., 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political 
Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Kandori, M., 1992. “Social Norms and Community Enforcement.” Review of Economic Studies 
59:63-80.  
Karlan, D., 2003. “Social Capital and Group Banking.” Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton 
University. Mimeo. 
Kennedy, B., I. Kawachi, and E. Brainward, 1998. “The Role of Social Capital in the Russian 
Mortality Crisis.” World Development 26(11):2029-43. 
Kikuchi, M., M. Fujita, and Y. Hayami, 2001. “State, Community and Market in the Determina-
tion of a National Irrigation Sysyem in the Philippines.” In M. Aoki and Y. Hayami, eds., 
Communities and Markets in Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Knack, S., and P. Keefer, 1997. “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff?” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 112:1251–88. 
Ladd, E. C., 1996. “The Data Just Don’t Show Erosion of America’s Social Capital.” Public 
Perspective 7:1-30. 
Loury, G. C., 1977. “A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences.” In P. Wallace and A. 
M. La Mond, eds., Women, Minorities, and Employment Discrimination. Lexington, MA: 
Heath. 
———, 2000. “Social Exclusion and Ethnic Group: The Challenge to Development Economics 
1999.” In B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz, eds., Annual World Bank Conference on Develop-
ment Economics 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Morduch, J., and T. Sicular, 2001. “Risk and Insurance in Transition: Perspectives from Zoup-
ing Country.” In M. Aoki and Y. Hayami, eds., Communities and Markets in Economic 
Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Narayan, D., and L. Pritchett, 1999. “Cents and Sociability: Household Income and Social Capi-
tal.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 47(4):871-97. 
Olson, M., 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Ostrom, E., 2000. “Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept.” In P. Dasgupta and I. 
Serageldin, eds., Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. World Bank, Washington, D. 
C. 
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, and J. Walker, 1994. Rules, Games and Common Pool Resources. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
THE PUZZLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
A CRITICAL REVIEW  39 
Otsuka, K., and T. Tachibana, 2001. “Evolution and Consequences of the Community Forest 
Management in the Hill Region of Nepal.” In M. Aoki and Y. Hayami, eds., Communities 
and Markets in Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Paxton, P., 1999. “Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator As-
sessment.” American Journal of Sociology 105(1):88-127. 
Portes, A., 1998. “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology.” Annual 
Review of Sociology 24:1–24. 
Portes, A., and P. Landolt, 1996. “The Downside of Social Capital.” The American Prospects 
26(May-June):18-21. 
Putnam, R., 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of Democ-
racy 6:65-78. 
, 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: 
Simon and Schuster. 
Quibria, M. G., 2002. Growth and Poverty: Lessons from the East Asian Miracle Revisited. 
ADB Institute Research Paper 33, Tokyo, Japan. 
Rodrik, D., 1998. Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict and Growth 
Collapses. NBER Working Paper No. 6350, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Schumpeter, J. A., 1934. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
, 1950. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Brothers. 
Smith, A., 1776, 1976. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Sobel, J., 2002. “Can We Trust Social Capital.” Journal of Economic Literature 40(March):139-
54. 
Solow, R. M., 2000. “Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance.” In P. Dasgupta and 
I. Serageldin, eds., Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. World Bank, Washington, 
D. C. 
Songtag, D., 2003. “In a Homeland Far From Home.” The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/16/magazine/16CAMBODIA.html. 
van Bastelaer, T., 2000. Imperfect Information, Social Capital and the Poor’s Acess to Credit. 
Working Paper No 234, Center for Institutional Reform and Informal Sector, University 
of Maryland. 
van Staveren, I., 2000. A Conceptualization of Social Capital in Economics: Commitments and 
Spillover Effects. Working Paper No. 324, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. 
Waldinger, R., 1996. Still the Promised City? African Americans and New Immigrants in Post-
industrial New York. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Weitzman, M., and C. Xu, 1994. “Chinese Township Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined 
Cooperatives.” Journal of Comparative Economics 18(2):121-45. 
Williamson, O. E., 1993. “Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization.” Journal of Law 
and Economics 36:453-86. 
Zak, P. J., and S. Knack, 2001. “Trust and Growth.” Economic Journal 111:295-321. 
